We present a denotational semantics for modal propositional logics with propositional quantifiers and connectives for propositional identity and reference. A proposition is here not given as a set of possible worlds but as the denotation of a formula under a valuation function. In fact, the semantics is independent from the possible worlds framework and derives from principles of non-Fregean Logic. Modal laws such as Necessitation are not a priori given. Our aim is to restore modal principles and to axiomatize normal modal logics as first-order theories with identity. We start with a basic system containing axiom K as the only modal principle and establish completeness results. Following an earlier approach (S. Lewitzka, Studia Logica 97(2), 233 -264, 2011), we regard a modality as an appropriate subset of the propositional universe of a model. We show that the Necessitation Rule as well as further modal principles can be restored by imposing specific semantic constraints. As a main result, we present model constructions proving that normal modal systems, such as K, T, S4, S5, K45, KD45, can be captured precisely by our denotational semantics. This paper can be seen as a proposal to study modal logics as first-order theories of propositions.
Introduction
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic ideas of non-Fregean logics introduced by R. Suszko (see, e.g., [2, 3, 16, 18, 19] ). In a series of papers [15, 20, 8, 9, 10, 11] , versions of non-Fregean logics have been studied as expressive semantic frameworks with applications in truth theory and epistemic logic. In this paper, we present a nonFregean framework for modal logics with propositional quantifiers. We further develop aspects of the approach presented in [9] where an epistemic non-Fregean logic with operators for a total truth predicate (originally introduced by Sträter [15] ), knowledge and common knowledge is investigated. The operators of the language are interpreted as predicates (i.e., subsets) of the propositional universe of a given model in such a way that certain conditions of adequacy are fulfilled. It turns out that truth, falsity as well as modalities such as knowledge and common knowledge can be seen as entities of the same ontological category, namely as sets of propositions. A proposition is here given as the denotation of a formula under the valuation function of the ambient model. 1 If one admits only two-element propositional universes, then one gets classical propositional logic, which is Fregean. Such two-element propositional universes alone, however, are not rich enough to model modalities in the way proposed in [9] and in this paper.
The main aim of [9] was to design an epistemic logic where modal principles can be modeled in a flexible way and strong modal laws, such as Necessitation, can be avoided or weakened. In that first approach, the question whether the proposed semantics is capable to capture exactly a standard modal system of knowledge, such as S4 (m) or S5 (m) , has been left open. One of the difficulties involved here is the introduction of the Necessitation Principle such that a completeness result can be proved. A further challenge is the development of model constructions which establish connections in both directions between the proposed semantics and the well-known possible worlds semantics. In this paper, we study these questions in the context of normal modal logics and are able to present positive results.
Our logic is an extension of basic non-Fregean logic SCI [2, 3] . The language contains propositional variables and constant symbols for propositions, an operator : true for the truth predicate, the necessity operator L, the identity connective ≡, a reference connective < and propositional quantifiers which essentially correspond to the sentential quantifiers of Suszko's theories of kind W (see, e.g., [16, 17, 19] ). The reference connective is a new, optional ingredient of non-Fregean logics introduced and studied in [7, 8, 9, 11] . A formula ϕ < ψ reads "ψ refers to ϕ". For instance, formula c : true says that c is true. In this sense, c : true refers to c, and the formula c < (c : true) is a theorem. If the equation c ≡ (c : true) is satisfied in a model, then the model-theoretic semantics implies that that model also satisfies the formula c < c expressing that (the proposition denoted by) c refers to itself. In fact, c denotes a truthteller -a self-referential proposition. For more details and specific model constructions we refer the reader to [11, 8, 9] . We will express "necessarily ϕ" by the formula ϕ : L, using postfix notation in order to emphasize our ontological view on necessity as a set of propositions. The symbol ":" can be read here as "is (element of)". We adopt this notation from weaker non-Fregean logics (see [15, 20, 8, 9, 10, 11] ) where a formula of the form ϕ : true reads as "ϕ is true". That formula is satisfied iff the proposition denoted by ϕ belongs to the set of true propositions. Similarly, ϕ : L is satisfied iff the valuation function maps ϕ to a necessary proposition. The set of necessary propositions is a subset of the propositional universe and it is closed under logical conditions which depend on the given modal axioms. Under these semantic assumptions we are able to prove our main result (Theorem 6.7) which says that if S is a certain normal modal system, then for each model of our semantics there is a world of a corresponding frame of S such that exactly the same modal propositional formulas are satisfied, and viceversa. In this sense, our semantics captures system S.
Completely different approaches to modality in logics with identity connective have been developed by Cresswell [4, 5] and Suszko [17] (see also the Historical Note at the end of [17] ). The approaches are of similar nature and the identity connective plays the crucial role. Both systems (explicitly or implicitly) contain the rule: if ϕ ↔ ψ is a theorem, then so is ϕ ≡ ψ (i.e., propositional identity is strict equivalence; note that this is a weakening of Fregean Axiom), and involve an equational definition of necessity as identity with a tautology: ϕ ≡ (ϕ ≡ ⊤), where the tautology ⊤ denotes the necessary proposition. Both principles derive from the metaphysical view on propositions as sets of possible worlds (see footnote 3, p.2 [12] and the reference there to [6] ). Suszko [17] defines two theories W T and W H ⊃ W T in a quantifier-free language of non-Fregean logic incorporating the above principles and some further axioms. It turns out that W T (W H ) is the theory of the class of topological (self-dual) Boolean algebras where the necessity operator is interpreted as an interior operator. Using a famous result due to McKinsey and Tarski [13] , Suszko then is able to derive that W T , W H correspond to the modal logics S4, S5, respectively.
We refer to the logic developed in this paper as ∈ L -Logic (Epsilon-L-Logic). ∈ LLogic extends ∈ T -Logic and adopts ∈ T -style semantics [20, 15, 11] . The symbol ∈ in ∈ L refers to the fact that ":" in a formula ϕ : L can be interpreted as the membership relation.
Syntax
..} is a countable infinite set of variables and C is a set of constant symbols. The set of formulas F m(C) is the smallest set that contains V ∪ C and is closed under the following conditions: If ϕ, ψ, χ ∈ F m(C) and x is a free variable of
Note that a formula of the form ∀x.ϕ has the property that the variable x occurs free in ϕ; strings such as ∀x.c or ∀x.∀y.y are not formulas.
Usually, we will omit outermost parenthesis. Further parenthesis can be omitted taking into account the following priorities of operators given in decreasing order: ¬, : true, : L, →, <, ≡, ∀. For instance, ¬ϕ : L stands for the formula ((¬ϕ) : L), ϕ → ψ : L stands for (ϕ → (ψ : L)) and ∀x.ϕ → ψ stands for ∀x.(ϕ → ψ). We use abbreviations such as ∃x.ϕ for ¬∀x.¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ for ¬(ϕ → ¬ψ), ϕ ↔ ψ for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) etc. For a formula of the form ∀x 1 .∀x 2 ...∀x n .ϕ we write ∀x 1 ...x n .ϕ. By f var(ϕ), var(ϕ), con(ϕ) we denote the set of free variables, variables, constant symbols occurring in ϕ, respectively. We define f con(ϕ) := f var(ϕ) ∪ con(ϕ). A formula with no free variables is called a sentence.
A substitution is a function σ : V ∪ C → F m(C). If A ⊆ V ∪ C and σ is a substitution such that σ(u) = u for all u ∈ (V ∪ C) A, then we write σ : A → F m(C). If σ is a substitution, u 0 , ..., u n ∈ V ∪ C and ϕ 0 , ..., ϕ n ∈ F m(C), then σ[u 0 := ϕ 0 , ..., u n := ϕ n ] is the substitution τ defined as follows:
ε is the identity substitution u → u. Instead of ε[u 0 := ϕ 0 , ..., u n := ϕ n ] we write [u 0 := ϕ 0 , ..., u n := ϕ n ]. A substitution σ extends in the canonical way to a function [σ] : F m(C) → F m(C) (we apply postfix notation for [σ]):
where y is the least variable of V greater than all elements of {f var(σ(u)) | u ∈ f con(∀x.ϕ)} (recall that V is well-ordered). We say that the variable y is forced by the substitution σ w.r.t. ∀x.ϕ.
The composition of two substitutions σ and τ is the substitution σ • τ defined by u → σ(u)[τ ] ("first apply σ, then apply τ "). The following Lemma collects some useful properties of substitutions.
Lemma 2.1 (Properties of substitutions)
Let ϕ ∈ F m(C) and let σ, τ, δ be substitutions. Then
• The variable y ∈ V forced by σ w.r.t. ∀x.ψ is the least element of V greater than all elements of f var((∃x.ψ)[σ]).
•
Two formulas ϕ and ψ are alpha-congruent, notation: ϕ = α ψ, if ϕ and ψ differ at most on their bound variables. Applying the identity substitution ε to a formula ϕ results, in general, in a renaming of bound variables. ϕ[ε] is in a certain normal form -we say that it is normalized. It holds that ϕ[ε] = α ϕ, and furthermore: [11] for proofs and more details). Our semantics will ensure that any two alpha-congruent formulas denote the same proposition.
In order to deal adequately with the reference connective < we need a transitive relation on formulas which we adopt from [7, 8, 9, 11] .
ϕ ≺ ψ captures the intuitive notion of "formula ψ says something about formula ϕ" or "formula ψ refers to formula ϕ". ϕ ≺ ψ implies that ϕ is alpha-congruent to a proper subformula of ψ. The converse is true only in a quantifier-free context. For instance, x ⊀ ∀x.(x → d), whereas x ≺ (x → d). In the latter case, the formula x → d says something about formula x, namely that formula x implies formula d. In the former case, however, the formula ∀x.(x → d) does not say anything about the formula x. Note that a syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ can never be a self-reference since no formula is a proper subformula of itself: ϕ ≺ ϕ is impossible, that is, there are no self-referential formulas. Self-reference must be shifted to the semantic level where it can be represented by the semantic reference relation < M on the propositional universe of a model M. Our model definition ensures that syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ implies semantic reference between the respective propositions. This semantic reference is expressed by ϕ < ψ. One can show that syntactical reference ≺ is transitive on formulas. Furthermore, if ϕ ≺ ψ and σ is a substitution, then
. For more details we refer the reader to [11] .
Deductive systems with and without Necessitation Rule
Our basic deductive system extends basic non-Fregean logic SCI, the Sentential Calculus with Identity [2, 3] , by axioms for propositional quantifiers (which essentially correspond to the sentential quantifiers of Suszko's theories of kind W [16, 17, 1] ) and modal axiom K. There is only the rule of Modus Ponens. Derivation in system AX + MP is defined in the same way as in propositional logic where Φ ⊢ ϕ means that formulas of Φ can be seen as axioms in a proof of ϕ. This is possible because of the absence of the Necessitation Rule: from ϕ infer ϕ : L. We will see later that AX + MP augmented with modal axiom 4 and the rule of Axiom Necessitation implies the Necessitation Principle (see Proposition 6.2): if ϕ is a theorem (i.e., derivable from the empty set), then so is ϕ : L. In such systems, one can maintain the natural notion of derivation. In order to introduce the Necessitation Principle also in weaker systems, i.e. in systems not containing 4 as a theorem, we formulate in the following an alternative notion of derivation which is common in modal logic and where Φ ⊢ S ϕ is defined in terms of theoremhood in system S. In sufficiently strong systems, however, we will prefer the more natural notion of derivation such as given in Definition 3.2. Of course, Φ ⊢ ϕ implies Φ ⊢ K ϕ which in turn implies Φ ⊢ T ϕ. System AX+ MP has no theorems of the form ϕ : L at all. Furthermore, logic K (logic T) seems to incorporate modal system K (modal system T), respectively. If this is the case, then one may ask whether every theorem of K (of T) in the language of modal propositional logic is also a theorem of modal system K (of T), respectively. In the next chapters we will formulate these and further questions in a precise way and present answers which are based on model-theoretic proofs.
Semantics
Our models are very similar to those defined in [11] . A predicate for necessity is here the additional ingredient. This ∈ T -style of semantics essentially relies on the approach developed by Sträter [15] and Zeitz [20] . We believe that one of the advantages over the algebraic models defined for Suszko's languages of kind W (see, e.g, [1] ) consists in a simpler treatment of sentential quantifiers. The algebraic structure of our models is not explicitly given but is implicitly imposed by the structural properties and truth conditions of the valuation function Γ .
• a non-empty propositional universe M
• a set T RU E ⊆ M of true propositions
x is the assignment that maps x to m and variables y ∈ V {x} to γ(y).
The Gamma-function has the following structural properties:
• For all x ∈ V and all assignments γ: Γ (x, γ) = γ(x). (Extension Property EP)
The Gamma-function satisfies the following truth conditions. For all assignments γ : V → M and for all formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ F m(C): Note that a T-model satisfies the following additional truth condition:
EC, for all formulas ϕ and all assignments γ. A model is a T-model if N EC ⊆ T RU E (i.e., every necessary proposition is true), and the truth condition of Necessitation w.r.t. T is satisfied:
ϕ ∈ T ⇒ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ N EC,Γ (ϕ : L, γ) ∈ T RU E ⇒ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ T RU E, for all formulas ϕ and all assignments γ ∈ M V . Definition 4.2 Let (M, γ) be an interpretation, ϕ ∈ F m(C). The satisfaction re- lation is defined by (M, γ) ϕ :⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ T RU E. If (M, γ) ϕ, then the interpretation (M, γ) is
called a model of ϕ. These notions extend in the usual way to sets of formulas. For
Φ ⊆ F m(C) define Int(Φ) := {(M, γ) Φ | M is a model, γ is an assignment}, Int K (Φ) := {(M, γ) Φ | M is a K-model, γ is an assignment} and Int T (Φ) := {(M, γ) Φ | M is a T-model, γ
is an assignment}. This leads to the following consequence relations:
Let M be a model and γ an assignment. By truth condition (vii), the set N := {ϕ ∈ F m(C) | Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ N EC} is closed under Modus Ponens. We will close N under logical consequence (equivalently: under deduction ⊢) by introducing the truth condition of Axiom Necessitation in Definition 6.1 below. Different Substitution Lemmata have been presented in [15, 20] . A proof of the following Lemma, based on ideas of Zeitz [20] , can be found in [8] .
Lemma 4.3 (Substitution Lemma
(ii) If γ : V → M is an assignment and σ is a substitution such that
Item (ii) provides a condition such that SP also holds for certain substitutions which are not restricted to the domain of variables. Item (i) implies the following fact (see, e.g., [11] for a proof).
Corollary 4.4 Suppose M is a model, γ, γ
′ are assignment, and ϕ ∈ F m(C). If
substitutions. Then the hypothesis together with (i) of the Substitution Lemma implies
Similarly for the remaining cases.
Let M be a model. We may define further modalities as sets (i.e., properties) of propositions:
Of course, P OSS, IM P, F ALSE stand for the set of possible, impossible, false propositions, respectively. By the Substitution Lemma, these sets are well-defined. The next result follows readily from the definitions.
Lemma 4.5
Let M be a model. For any ϕ ∈ F m(C) and any assignment γ : V → M :
As expected, alpha-congruent formulas denote the same proposition. The following Alpha Property derives from SP and the way we defined substitutions. In [15, 20] substitutions are defined differently, and in [20] the SP does not imply the Alpha Property which has to be introduced as an additional semantic constraint. We adopt the proof of the next result from [11] .
Lemma 4.6 (Alpha Property) Let M be a model. For all formulas ϕ, ψ and all assignments
Proof. Suppose ϕ = α ψ. This is equivalent with the condition ϕ[ε] = ψ[ε], where ε is the identity substitution (see [11] ). It holds that γ = γε, for any assignment γ :
Now it is not hard to show that all interpretations (M, γ) satisfy AX. Only axiom (xvi) is a bit complicated. We must show that Γ (∀x.ϕ, γ) ∈ T RU E implies Γ (ϕ[x := ψ], γ) ∈ T RU E for all formulas ψ. So suppose Γ (ϕ, γ m x ) ∈ T RU E for all m ∈ M . Let ψ be any formula, put p := Γ (ψ, γ). Let σ be the substitution [x := ψ]. By definition, γσ(y) = Γ (σ(y), γ), for any y ∈ V . This implies equality of assignments: γσ = γ p x . By SP and the hypothesis,
Thus, axiom (xvi) is sound. Now one easily shows that a model M is a K-model iff (M, γ) satisfies all formulas of set K, for any assignment γ; and analogously for a T-model. This establishes soundness of the three systems:
Completeness Theorems
Completeness theorems for non-Fregean logics with propositional quantifiers (sometimes called: sentential quantifiers) have been proved, e.g., in [1, 15, 20] . In our proof, we follow the usual Henkin construction and adapt some technical machinery from [15, 20, 11, 10, 14] . First, we show completeness of basic system AX + MP w.r.t. the class of all models. Slight modifications of the construction then yield completeness of logic K w.r.t. the class of all K-models and completeness of logic T w.r.t. the class of all T-models. Proof. The proof is an induction on the length n ≥ 1 of a derivation Φ ⊢ ϕ. If n = 1, then ϕ must be an axiom (note that ϕ ∈ Φ is impossible because c ∈ con(ϕ) does not occur in Φ). By Lemma 5. 
Note that ¬ϕ x can be written as (∃x.¬ϕ) → ¬ϕ[x := c ϕ,x ]. In this sense, c ϕ,x can be seen as a witness for the truth of ∃x.¬ϕ. 
Lemma 5.7 Let Φ be maximally consistent, ϕ, ψ ∈ F m(C). Then:
Lemma 5.8 Let Φ ⊆ F m(C) be maximally consistent. Then ≈ Φ is an equivalence relation on F m(C) containing alpha-congruence and satisfying the following:
Proof. From AX it follows immediately that ≈ Φ is reflexive and contains alphacongruence. Suppose ϕ ≈ Φ ψ. Since ϕ ≈ Φ ϕ, by AX and Modus Ponens we get (ϕ ≡ ϕ) ≈ Φ (ψ ≡ ϕ) and finally ψ ≈ Φ ϕ. Thus, the relation is symmetric. Now let ϕ ≈ Φ ψ and ψ ≈ Φ χ. Again, AX and Modus Ponens yield
. By symmetry and Modus Ponens, ϕ ≈ Φ χ. It follows that the relation is transitive. The congruence properties follow readily from AX.
Theorem 5.9 Every Henkin set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ F m(C) be a Henkin set. By ϕ we denote the equivalence class of
Since Φ is a Henkin set, Φ ¬(c ≡ ϕ) for some c ∈ C. By maximally consistency of Φ, Φ ⊢ c ≡ ϕ. This proves Claim 1. Let us define the ingredients of our model.
For an assignment γ : V → M let τ γ : V → F m(C) be a function with the property τ γ (x) ∈ γ(x), for every x ∈ V . Notice that τ γ : V → M is a substitution. Then define Γ (ϕ, γ) := c, where c is a constant symbol satisfying c ≈ Φ ϕ[τ γ ].
By Lemma 5.8 and Claim 1, the above sets and the Gamma-function are well-defined.
It is clear that
. Proof of the Claim: follows from AX by induction on ϕ simultaneously for all σ. Claim 3: The Gamma-function satisfies the structural conditions of a model. Proof of the Claim: EP follows immediately. In order to show CP let ϕ ∈ F m(C) and let γ, γ ′ be assignments such that γ(x) = γ ′ (x) for all x ∈ f var(ϕ). Then τ γ (x) ≈ Φ τ γ ′ (x) for all x ∈ f var(ϕ). Now we may apply Claim 2. Next, we show SP. Let σ : V → F m(C) be a substitution and ϕ ∈ F m(C). We must show:
The assertion now follows from Claim 2. Thus, SP holds. Now suppose ϕ ≺ ψ. This
, and RP is satisfied. Claim 4: The Gamma-function satisfies the truth conditions. Proof of the Claim:
The quantifier case can be shown as follows: 
Proof of the Claim:
We have τ β (x) ≈ Φ ε(x) for all x ∈ f var(ϕ), where ε is the identity substitution. By Claim 2,
is alpha-congruent with ϕ (see [11] for details), and alpha-congruence is contained in ≈ Φ . Then the Claim follows from transitivity of ≈ Φ . We have shown that
is a model. Applying Claim 5 and the second item of Lemma 5.7 it follows that the interpretation (M, β) is a model of the Henkin set Φ:
Theorem 5.10 Every consistent set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ F m(C) be consistent. We show that Φ extends to a Henkin set Φ * in an extended language F m(C * ). By Theorem 5.9, Φ * has a model. We will see that its reduct w.r.t. the sublanguage F m(C) is a model of Φ. Let C 0 := C, Φ 0 := Φ. If C n and Φ n ⊆ F m(C n ) are already defined, then define
according to the notation of Definition 5.4. By Lemma 5.5, Φ n+1 is consistent in F m(C n+1 ). Finally, we put Φ + := n<ω Φ n . It follows that Φ + ⊆ F m(C * ), where C * = n<ω C n . Since derivation is finitary, Φ + is consistent in the language F m(C * ). By a standard argument that uses Zorn's Lemma, Φ + extends to a maximally consistent set
, for all c ∈ C * . The other way around, suppose Φ * ⊢ ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C * , where x ∈ f var(ϕ). Let n be minimal with the property ϕ ∈ F m(C n ).
This is a contradiction to Φ * ⊢ ¬ϕ x and the consistency of Φ * . Therefore, Φ * ⊢ ∀x.ϕ. We have shown that Φ * has the properties of a Henkin set. Let (M * , β) be a model of Φ * w.r.t. the language F m(C * ), and let Γ * be the Gamma-function of M * . Let Γ be the restriction of Γ * to the domain F m(C) ⊆ F m(C * ). If we replace Γ * with Γ in M * , then obviously we get a model M such that (M, β) ϕ ⇔ (M * , β) ϕ for all formulas ϕ ∈ F m(C). In this sense, the model M is the reduct of M * to the sublanguage F m(C). In particular, (M, β) Φ.
Theorem 5.11 (Completeness Theorems)
For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F m(C):
Proof. Suppose Φ ϕ. From propositional logic and Theorem 5.10 it follows that Φ ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent and has a model. Thus, Φ ϕ. Adapting straightforwardly the constructions and results of this section to the logics K and T completes the proof.
Definition 5.12 For a given set of constants C, the logic given proof-theoretically by basic system AX + MP and model-theoretically by the class of all interpretations
over the set C of constant symbols.
Capturing normal modal logics
Throughout this section let L ⊆ F m(C) be the language of modal propositional logic with V as the set of propositional variables and the necessity operator L as the primitive modal operator in postfix notation: ϕ : L. Within our language F m(C) we formulate the following additional axioms:
, where ⊥ is a fixed contradictory formula.
Further modal axioms could be considered in the following constructions. We leave such investigations to future work and concentrate here on the principles T, 4, 5 and D. •
• M od(AX ′ + AN) is the class of those models M ∈ M od(AX ′ ) satisfying additionally the following truth condition of Axiom Necessitation w.r.t.
• M od(K) is the class of all K-models and M od(T) is the class of all T-models.
The systems K and T rely on the Necessitation Principle which has been established by introducing the Necessitation Rule. On the other hand, the systems AX ′ +MP+AN rely on the weaker rule of Axiom Necessitation. This results in a more natural notion of proof or derivation (see Definition 3.3 and the preceding discussion). Moreover, if the system contains axiom 4 as a theorem, then the Necessitation Principle can be established without Necessitation Rule as the following observation shows.
Proposition 6.2 (Necessitation Principle) If the system AX ′ + MP + AN contains axiom 4, then it is normal (i.e., it involves the Necessitation Principle).
Proof. Suppose ϕ is a theorem of AX ′ + MP + AN. We show the assertion by induction on the length n of the derivation of ϕ. If n = 1, then ϕ is an axiom or ϕ is derived by the rule of Axiom Necessitation. In the former case, we apply AN and get the theorem ϕ : L. In the latter case, ϕ = ψ : L for some axiom ψ. By axiom 4 and an instance of axiom (xvi) we get ψ : L → ψ : L : L. Modus Ponens yields ψ : L : L. That is, ϕ : L is a theorem. Now suppose there are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ, derived in at most n ≥ 1 steps, and ϕ is obtained by Modus Ponens. By induction hypothesis, ψ : L and (ψ → ϕ) : L are derivable from the empty set. The formula
is obtained by axioms K and (xvi). Now we apply Modus Ponens and derive ϕ : L.
Of course, a T-model is also a K-model. The next result is a semantic counterpart of Proposition 6.2.
Proof. Induction on the construction of logic K. Let ϕ ∈ K. If ϕ ∈ AX ⊆ K, then the assertion follows from the truth condition of Axiom Necessitation of M. Suppose ϕ ∈ K because of ψ → ϕ, ψ ∈ K and Modus Ponens. Then the assertion follows from the induction hypothesis and truth condition (vii) of M. Finally, suppose ϕ = ψ : L ∈ K because of the Necessitation Rule applied to ψ ∈ K. Since 4 ∈ AX ′ , model M satisfies all formulas of the form χ : L → χ : L : L (under any assignment). Then M must satisfy the following additional truth condition: Γ (χ, γ) ∈ N EC ⇒ Γ (χ : L, γ) ∈ N EC, for all formulas χ and all assignments γ. By induction hypothesis, Γ (ψ, γ) ∈ N EC for any assignment γ. Thus,
We have proved soundness and completeness of the three systems AX, K and T w.r.t. suitable classes of models. The next result follows easily from adaptations of the first Completeness Theorem. We leave the details to the reader. 
• M od(T) captures modal logic K iff for all ϕ ∈ L: ϕ is a theorem of system T iff ϕ is a theorem of T.
• M od(AX ′ + AN) captures S iff for all ϕ ∈ L: ϕ is a theorem of system AX ′ + MP + AN iff ϕ is a theorem of S.
Theorem 6.7 (Capturing normal modal propositional logics)
The following hold true.
• M od(K) captures modal logic K.
• M od(T) captures modal logic T.
• M od(AX + T + 4 + AN) captures modal logic S4.
• M od(AX + T + 4 + 5 + AN) captures modal logic S5.
• M od(AX + 4 + 5 + AN) captures modal logic K45.
• M od(AX + 4 + 5 + D + AN) captures modal logic KD45.
In the remaining part of the paper we shall prove Theorem 6.7. Remark 6.6 and Proposition 6.2 seem to provide promising proof-theoretic arguments. However, this paper is about semantics, so we concentrate here on a model-theoretic proof. This will give us some interesting insights into connections between our denotational semantics and possible worlds semantics. As above, we let L ⊆ F m(C) be the language of modal propositional logic (with the appropriate adaptations). Recall that a frame of modal logic is a structure F = (W, R), where W is a set of worlds and R ⊆ W × W is the accessibility relation. A truth value assignment of a frame
V . The satisfaction relation (w, g) ϕ is inductively defined as follows (note that the symbol denotes two different things: on the one hand, logical consequence in ∈ L -Logic, and on the other hand, satisfaction in modal logic; we are confident that there is no risk of confusion):
) ϕ for all w ′ ∈ W with wRw ′ . By well-known completeness results, modal system K can be identified with the set of L-formulas valid in all frames, and system T (S4, S5, K45, KD45) is the set of Lformulas valid in all those frames whose accessibility relation is reflexive (reflexive and transitive; an equivalence relation; transitive and euclidean; serial and transitive and euclidean), respectively. If we are able to show that for any world w and assignment g of a frame of modal system S4 there is a model M ∈ M od(AX + T + 4 + AN) and an assignment γ such that (w, g) and (M, γ) satisfy the same L-formulas, and vice-versa, then it follows that M od(AX + T + 4 + AN) captures system S4; and similarly for the other cases. That is, our proof will rely on model constructions. 
Proof. The idea is to define the propositional universe M as a set of formulas of modal propositional logic, and the Gamma-function as a certain translation or reduction of the language F m(C) to M . A problem, however, is the reduction of formulas of the form ∀x.ϕ to appropriate propositional (i.e., quantifier-free) formulas. We solve this problem by extending L in the obvious way to the infinitary language L ω1 which we obtain by considering the following additional rule: If Φ is any (countable) set of formulas of L ω1 , then Φ ∈ L ω1 . Also, we extend the satisfaction relation of modal logic to the relation ω1 which fulfills the following additional condition:
ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Φ, where w ′ is any world and g ′ is any truth value assignment. Proceeding from these assumptions we now define the propositional universe by M := L ω1 , T RU E := {ϕ ∈ L ω1 | (w, g) ω1 ϕ} and
Let ⊤ be a fixed propositional tautology, ⊥ a fixed propositional contradiction. We define the Gammafunction simultaneously for all assignments γ ∈ M V in the following way:
. 3 We must show that the structural properties and truth conditions of a model hold and that M is a K-model. EP holds by definition. CP and SP can be proved by induction on formulas. We show the quantifier case of SP. Let ϕ = ∀x.ψ. One easily shows that for all y ∈ f var(ψ) the following holds: 
Thus, SP holds. RP is trivially satisfied. One easily checks that Γ satisfies the truth conditions of a model. Note that an assignment γ : V → M is also a substitution, and for ϕ ∈ L it holds that
We consider the assignment ε : V → M , x → x, i.e., the identity substitution. Then
Finally, let us prove that M is a K-model. We must show: ϕ ∈ K ⇒ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ N EC. Actually, we will prove the following stronger result: Claim:
Proof of the Claim: Induction on the definition of K. Suppose ϕ ∈ AX. Then it is not hard to check that ω1 Γ (ϕ, γ). For example, let ϕ be axiom (i), i.e., ϕ = ∀xy.(x → (y → x)), and let γ be any assignment. Then
Equation (*) follows from (6.2). The last formula is equivalent with an infinite conjunction of tautologies. Hence, ω1 Γ (ϕ, γ). Now, we consider axiom (xvi): Now we prove the converse of Theorem 6.8 and Remark 6.9. The following theorem concentrates on the case of modal logic S4 from which we will derive the remaining cases. Theorem 6.10 Let M ∈ M od(AX + T + 4 + AN) and let γ : V → M be an assignment. There exists a frame (W, R) of modal logic S4, a truth value assignment g : W → (V → {0, 1}), and a world w ∈ W such that for all ϕ ∈ L ⊆ F m(C):
Proof. ∈ L -Logic is classical in the sense that it has classical connectives and the consequence relation is compact. A theory of the logic is, by definition, a consistent and deductively closed set of formulas (i.e., it is satisfiable and closed under logical consequence). It is well-known that the set of all deductively closed sets (including F m(C)) forms a closure system (i.e., it is closed under intersections of arbitrary subsets). The corresponding closure operator cl, given by cl(Φ) = {T | T is a theory containing Φ}, has the property that ϕ ∈ cl(Φ) iff Φ ϕ. In a classical logic, a set of formulas T is a theory iff T is the intersection of a non-empty class of maximal theories. This property will play a crucial role in the following. We define
Let W be the set of all tuples (T, N ) with the following properties: 
Claim 3: For every (T, N ) ∈ W , N is a theory. Proof of the Claim: Let (T, N ) ∈ W . By Claim 1, N is consistent. It is enough to prove that N ⊢ ϕ implies ϕ ∈ N . We show this by induction on the length of a derivation. If the length is 1, then ϕ ∈ N or ϕ ∈ AX. We may assume that ϕ ∈ AX. By Axiom Necessitation, we get ϕ ∈ N 0 ⊆ N . If the length of the derivation is greater than 1, then there are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ such that N ⊢ ψ and N ⊢ ψ → ϕ. By induction hypothesis, ψ, ψ → ϕ ∈ N . By definition of N we get (ψ : L), (ψ → ϕ) : L ∈ T . Of course, AX ⊆ T . In particular, the axioms K and (xvi) belong to T . Thus, (ϕ : L) ∈ T and ϕ ∈ N . We have proved that N is deductively closed.
Let Y be the set of all maximal theories that extend N . We show Y ⊆ X. Suppose T ′ ∈ Y and let , it follows that all worlds of W are related by R. This universal relation R on W is an equivalence relation. If g is the truth value assignment defined above, then we get the equivalence (6.4).
The cases KD45 and K45:
First, we treat the case KD45. The corresponding version of Theorem 6.10 refers to models M ∈ M od(AX + 4 + 5 + D + AN) and to frames (W, R) of modal logic KD45. In the absence of axiom T we cannot assume that in a given model the inclusion N EC ⊆ T RU E holds true. We define the set of all worlds as the set W of those maximal theories T that satisfy N T = N 0 , where N T := {ϕ ∈ F m(C) | (ϕ : L) ∈ T } and N 0 is defined as above. Similarly as in Claim 3 one shows that N 0 is deductively closed, i.e., N 0 ⊢ ϕ implies ϕ ∈ N 0 . Since model M satisfies axiom D, it follows that ⊥ / ∈ N 0 and N 0 is consistent. That is, N 0 is a theory. Claim 5: If T is a maximal theory extending N 0 , then T ∈ W . Proof of the Claim. Let T ⊇ N 0 . Note that not necessarily N T ⊆ T . However, following the proofs of Claim 2 and 2' we can show that N 0 = N T (we apply here Axiom Necessitation of model M and the axioms 4 and 5). Thus, T ∈ W . Claim 6: N 0 = {T ∈ W | N 0 ⊆ T } Proof of the Claim. Since N 0 is a theory, it suffices to show that every maximal theory T containing N 0 belongs to W . We can apply Claim 5. We define the accessibility R on W by T RT ′ :⇔ N 0 ⊆ T ′ . Now suppose T ∈ W . Since N 0 is consistent, there is a maximal theory T ′ extending N 0 . By Claim 5, T ′ ∈ W . Thus, T RT ′ and R is serial. It is easy to check that R is also transitive and euclidean. That is, (W, R) is in fact a frame of modal logic KD45. Define a truth value assignment g : W → (V → {0, 1}) by g T (x) = 1 ⇔ x ∈ T . By induction on formulas ϕ ∈ L one shows that for all worlds T ∈ W the following analogue to (6.4) is satisfied:
ϕ ∈ T ⇔ (T, g) ϕ.
The proof works in a very similar way as above. The crucial argument relies here on Claim 6. Note that we may argue as above if we abandon axiom D and consider the case of K45. In this case, N 0 is still deductively closed but not necessarily a theory (i.e., it is possibly inconsistent). It holds that ⊥ ∈ N 0 iff N 0 = F m(C). Thus, Claim 6 remains true since in the case of ⊥ ∈ N 0 we get N 0 = ∅ = F m(C). Note that W = ∅ since T 0 ∈ W . The accessibility relation R, defined as above, is still transitive and euclidean. However, if N 0 is inconsistent, the R cannot be serial.
The cases K and T: Let M be a K-model and γ be any assignment. Recall that logic K is contained in N 0 (N 0 and T 0 are defined as above). We define the set of worlds W as the set of all maximal theories that contain logic K. 4 By Necessitation Rule of K, T ∈ W implies K ⊆ N T , where N T := {ϕ ∈ F m(C) | (ϕ : L) ∈ T } as above. The accessibility relation is given by T RT ′ :⇔ N T ⊆ T ′ . Since axiom K belongs to K and K ⊆ N T , K ⊆ T , for T ∈ W , it follows that N T is deductively closed (see the proof of Claim 3). Thus, N T is the meet of all maximal theories that extend N T . All these maximal theories are in W . This is the crucial argument applied in the induction proof of the analogue of (6.4): ϕ ∈ T ⇔ (T, g) ϕ, for every ϕ ∈ L and T ∈ W , and for the truth value assignment g : W → (V → {0, 1}) defined by g T (x) = 1 :⇔ x ∈ T . Thus, we get a frame (W, R) of modal logic K such that w := T 0 ∈ W together with assignment g have the desired properties. Now suppose M is a T-model. We define W as the set of all maximal theories containing logic T. It follows that R, defined as in case K, is reflexive. The analogue of (6.4) follows by similar arguments as above. Thus, the resulting frame (W, R) is in fact a frame of modal logic T and w = T 0 ∈ W together with assignment g have the desired properties.
